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Chill
Chill
FR

Security

SSH keys encrypted via AES-GCM (Android) and Keychain (iOS). Never transmitted.

PIN hashed with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 100,000 iterations. Built-in brute force protection.

Zero data sent to our servers. No telemetry, no analytics.

Screen protection enabled. Anti-capture and anti-recording by default.

Data Protection

Sensitive data storage

All sensitive data is stored via Flutter Secure Storage: AES-GCM encryption on Android (hardware Android Keystore) and Keychain on iOS. The master encryption key is stored in the device's hardware keystore, making extraction impossible even with root access. Protected data: SSH private keys, PIN hash, SSH server fingerprints, audit log, Wake-on-LAN configurations, and command history. No secrets are hardcoded in the source code — a full codebase scan confirms this.

Authentication & Connections

SSH connection and TOFU verification

Standard SSH2 protocol. Preferred key algorithm: Ed25519 (256 bits). On first connection, the server's SHA-256 fingerprint is displayed. The user must manually confirm it. The fingerprint is then stored and automatically verified. If it changes: red alert with an explanation of the interception risk (MITM). Fingerprint comparison is performed in constant time (bitwise XOR) to prevent timing attacks. 16 weak SSH algorithms are blocked at the software level (SHA-1, CBC, arcfour, 3DES and their variants). Only modern, recommended algorithms are accepted. Private keys are loaded into a dedicated SecureBuffer. After use, memory is zeroed out. The SSH worker re-reads the key from secure storage on each new connection — no persistence in memory between sessions. Cryptographic operations run in a separate isolate (background thread).

Local authentication and brute force protection

PIN code: minimum 8 digits (100 million combinations). Hashed with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 over 100,000 iterations, combined with a unique random salt of 32 bytes. The plaintext PIN is never stored. Hash comparison is performed in constant time. Brute force protection: lockout after 5 failed attempts, with exponential backoff (30s, 60s, 120s, capped at 300s). The counter is monotonic: it only resets after a correct PIN, never by delay expiration. Biometrics: native system API, biometric data never leaves the device. Strict mode: biometrics only, no fallback to the device system PIN. Automatically invalidated when the app goes to background. Configurable auto-lock (5, 10, 15 or 30 minutes). Loading screen at startup until the PIN state is fully loaded, preventing any temporary bypass.

Data leak protection

Command history: regex filtering excludes AWS keys, JWT/Bearer tokens, API keys, command-line passwords, and sensitive variables. Automatic expiration after 90 days. Manual wipe available. Clipboard: automatically cleared 30 seconds after any sensitive data copy. Also cleared when the app goes to background via the native Android API. Production logs: all debug calls gated by kDebugMode. Zero logs in release builds. No hostnames, IPs, or identifiers in production. Go logs (Tailscale) are filtered to prevent OAuth token or authentication URL leaks.

Screen protection

Android: FLAG_SECURE enabled by default. Blocks screenshots and screen recording. The app appears as a black screen in the recent apps selector. Can be disabled in settings. iOS: automatic masking screen when the app goes to background. Prevents content capture in the app switcher. Can be disabled in settings.

Compromised device detection

At startup, the app checks for the presence of root (Android) or jailbreak (iOS) characteristic paths and files. If detected: a warning banner explains the risk to SSH key security. This is an informational measure, not a blocking one — the user can continue at their own discretion.

Anti-tampering protection

Integrated runtime protection detects 12 types of threats: root/jailbreak, attached debugger, code injection hooks, emulator, APK tampering, unofficial store installation, missing obfuscation, no device screen lock, developer mode enabled, and ADB connection. Two configurable modes: "Warn" (event logged in the encrypted audit journal) or "Block" (alert screen preventing app usage). Automatically disabled in debug mode to avoid false positives during development. Configurable by the user in Settings > Security.

Features & Integrations

Audit log

Automatically recorded events: SSH connection (success/failure), disconnection, reconnection, authentication failure, SSH key import/deletion, PIN creation/deletion, server fingerprint change. Each entry is chained with a SHA-256 hash of the previous entry. Tampering with any single entry invalidates all subsequent entries — integrity is verifiable at any time. Stored encrypted in secure storage, compact JSON format with timestamps. FIFO rotation at 500 entries. Never leaves the device.

SFTP transfers and key import

SFTP transfers limited to 30 MB per file. Chunk-based streaming, no full loading into memory — prevents saturation attacks (DoS/OOM). Directory traversal detection. SSH key import: format validated, size limited to 16 KB (a normal key is under 5 KB). Abnormally large files are blocked. Immediate storage in secure storage after import.

Tailscale integration

WireGuard VPN connection via libtailscale (native Go library, Kotlin channel). OAuth authentication URLs are never logged in plaintext — only their length is recorded in debug mode. Peer public keys are truncated in logs. Error messages are generic. URL validation: HTTPS scheme only before opening in the browser. No Tailscale token stored on the Flutter side — all token-related code has been removed.

Supply chain security

6 security-critical packages are locked to exact versions (no automatic updates via the ^ operator): SSH library, cryptographic primitives, secure storage, biometric authentication, and anti-tampering framework. APK signing is mandatory for release builds — the build fails without a production keystore. Code obfuscation is enabled on every release build: class names, methods, and variables are made unreadable, and debug symbols are separated and never included in the distributed binary.

Permissions and architecture

Android: ADB backup disabled (allowBackup=false), services not exported, VPN service protected by system permissions. Only necessary permissions requested: network (SSH/WoL), biometric sensor (optional), local storage (encrypted credentials). SSH cryptographic operations in a separate isolate (background thread). Request identifiers use cryptographically random UUID v4. Interface translated into 5 languages, no sensitive strings hardcoded.

Transparency

Known limitations

The following limitations are documented for transparency. Honest disclosure of trade-offs is preferable to concealment. The SSH private key passes through memory as a Dart String (immutable), potentially persisting until garbage collection. Low impact: requires a rooted device with memory access. Mitigated by re-reading from secure storage on each connection. The Dart garbage collector may create temporary copies in memory. Same prerequisites. Root detection can be bypassed by advanced tools (Magisk Hide). Informational measure only. The generated Ed25519 key uses cipher=none. Acceptable as long as it remains in secure storage (AES/Keychain encrypted). The PIN hash is stored in SharedPreferences (locally accessible). Mitigated by PBKDF2 making offline brute force impractical.

Audit results

All audits are internal reviews conducted with specialized security analysis tools. No external audit has been performed to date. White-box audit V1.5.1 (February 2026): score improved from 6.5 to 8.5/10, 9 fixes applied. STRIDE analysis (February 2026): 22 threats identified, 8 risks validated, 12 mitigations implemented at 100%. Quality audit (February 2026): 4 critical bugs fixed, dead code removed, 92/92 tests pass. Advanced security audit (February 2026): 62 findings, 0 remotely exploitable vulnerability. 27 fixed, 11 mitigated/documented. Red Team + defensive hardening (February 2026): 25 attack vectors identified and analyzed, 26 security modules created, 30 existing files hardened. 738 automated tests — 0 regressions.

HUYNH Kevin

Creator of Chill

Published